HomeMy WebLinkAboutEthics Complaint Order Granting Summary Judgment to Mayor Faber and Dismissing Ethics Complaint RE: In re Mayor David Faber1
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BEFORE THE ETHICS HEARING OFFICER FOR THE CITY
OF PORT TOWNSEND
Phil Olbrechts
RE: In re Mayor David Faber Order Granting Summary Judgment to
Mayor Faber and Dismissing Ethics
Ethics Complaint Complaint
Summary judgment is granted to Mayor Faber and denied to Reverand Cox. Mayor
Faber is again not found to have violated the City's ethics code for voting in favor of
a street improvement project near his law office. Ethics constraints on legislative
votes are minimal. Since the funding vote was legislative Mayor Faber clearly did
not violate any ethics standard.
Reverand Cox refiled her complaint solely on the basis that she discovered a staff
memo advising City Council members to recuse themselves from any votes for
projects that were within three blocks of property they owned. Mayor Faber
complied with the terms of the memo. The funding he voted for was an
implementing measure. The memo authorized votes on implementing measures.
There is no outstanding material question of fact regarding Mayor Faber's
compliance with the memo. He complied with the memo and that on its own is
sufficient to dismiss the complaint.
Mayor Faber also did not violate the ethics code because the memo was not any
binding policy that any councilmember was obligated to follow. The memo was
adopted by the City Manager in conjunction with the City Attorney as an advisory
tool only. The City Manager and City Attorney have no authority to adopt policies
that dictate how the Council can vote. Only the City Council has that local authority.
The memo merely "asked" councilmembers to follow its guidance. The memo
provided a simple and straightforward rule of thumb designed to "protect"
councilmembers from inadvertent violations of the ethics code. To both be simple
enough to apply while at the same time cover the wide range of potential violations in
the ethics code, the memo had to necessarily be overly conservative for most types of
violations. That memo guidance was highly conservative as applied to legislative
votes. Even if not an implementing vote, Mayor Faber's vote was clearly not an
ethics violation for the reasons identified in the dismissal of the first complaint filed
by Reverand Cox against Mayor Faber'.
' The order granting partial sufficiency for this case noted that the February 26 memo could establish a
City interpretation of RCW 42.23.070(1) special privilege violations as including legislative votes on
projects located within three blocks of councilmember owned property. That issue need not be reached
since Mayor Faber complied with the memo. However, even if the record did establish such a City
practice, the Hearing Officer would still not have found a violation. Rather, he would have advised the
Ethics Complaint P. 1 Final Ruling
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Background
Reverand Cox's first complaint against Mayor Faber was filed by email dated July
15, 2024. The complaint alleged five ethics violations. One of those allegations
alleged that Mayor Faber secured special privileges for himself in violation of RCW
42.23.070(1) because he voted to approve some funding of street improvements
located a half block from his law office building in which he has an ownership
interest.
In the street improvement allegation, Reverand Cox alleged that Mayor Faber's vote
constituted a special privilege for him because the funding would increase the
property value of his law office. The improvements are located along Lawrence
Street between Harrison and Taylor. Roughly 18 buildings front these improvements.
The buildings include a library, a theater and several commercial buildings. The
improvements benefitted numerous property owners as well as the general public
patronizing these public and commercial buildings. The potential objectives of the
funding of the improvements, therefore, extended well beyond increasing Mayor
Faber's property values. Given the widespread benefit served by the improvements
and the lack of any evidence that Mayor Faber voted solely on the basis to enrich
himself, a violation was not found per Hearing Officer email dated October 7, 2024.
Reverand Cox refiled the subject ethics complaint for the same violation on February
28, 2025. She refiled her complaint because she had found a February 26, 2024
memo from City Manager John Mauro that advised Mayor Faber on when to recuse
himself from voting on projects. The memo outlined procedures to avoid violating the
special privileges clause, leading with "...we ask that you use the following
procedures:.." (emphasis added). As pertinent, the memo included the following
paragraph:
Finally, for any projects proposed by the City or that others propose the
City undertake in the area within 3 blocks of your property, or any
project that could reasonably create an appearance of conflict between
City action or proposed action and your property, you should recuse
yourself from discussion or voting on any transaction. For example, if
the issue were whether to pave streets and ifso which streets, you should
not be involved in that decision process. Once the decision was made for
an action, you could be involved in the implementation of the action.
City Council to adopt the memo as Council policy if that was their intent. Absent a City Council
adoption, there would not have been adequate legal notice to Councilmembers that violation of the
advice in the staff memo constituted an ethics violation.
Ethics Complaint p. 2 Final Ruling
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The project specific nature of the February 26, 2024 memo and its purpose was
clarified by Heidi Greenwood, City Attorney, in a February 15, 2024 email to City
staff:
The memo that Steve attached come from Mayor Faber's previous
application. It is really more of a protection for the Council Members
than for staff, since the Council Members are the one who may
potentially violate ethics rules in this situation. I would recommend that
we use a similar document to ensure that Council Members and staff
avoid any ethical quandaries. We live in a small town and it may be
difficult for staff, Council Members, and the public to distinguish when
Council Members are acting in their official or private capacity. Having
this type of documentation and policy in place will allow the City to
quickly handle any potential allegations of unethical behavior.
In subsequent staff email exchanges over Ms. Greenwood's February 15, 2024 email,
staff discussed how to make the memo more generic so that it would be sent to all
councilmembers dealing with the City as private citizens. The planning director
responded in a February 20, 2024 email that staff could "update this letter to be a
little more generic and reusable." John Mauro subsequently emailed some version of
the memo to Mayor Faber and Councilmember Ben Thomas by emails dated
February 26, 2024.E
The email exchanges outlined above were included in Reverand Cox's summary
judgment motion. Unfortunately the emails she included did not include the attached
versions of the memo sent to Mayor Faber so the record is unclear as to what version
of the memo was sent to Mayor Faber on February 26, 2024 or the one sent to him in
the "prior" application referenced by Ms. Greenwood.
Reverand Cox's refiled February 28, 2025 ethics complaint was found sufficient by
order dated May 11, 2025. Mayor Faber filed his motion for summary judgment on
May 18, 2025. Reverand Cox filed her summary judgment motion on May 22, 2025.
Mayor Faber submitted a response and reply on May 27, 2025. Reverand Cox
submitted a reply on June 5, 2025.
Legal Analysis
A. Overview
2 The email exchanges resulting from the February 15, 2024 Greenwood memo were taken from those
printed out in Reverand Cox's motion for summary judgment. The emails included in Reverand Cox's
summary judgment motion don't include all the attachments but as best as can be ascertained from what
is included, the depiction above is accurate.
Ethics Complaint p. 3 Final Ruling
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The memo February 26, 2024 memo is simply a guidance document. It is not binding
policy adopted by the City Council. As such, Mayor Faber had no obligation to
follow the memo. Even if he did, he complied with the terms of the memo. The
memo authorizes participation in implementing decisions for City projects. The street
improvements at issue had been decided upon in the City's six -year street plan. The
funding voted upon by Mayor Faber was an implementation of that decision.
B. February 26, 2024 Memo Is Advisory Only
Taking judicial notice of the City's municipal code and adopted resolutions, it is clear
from Ms. Greenwood's February 15, 2024 email as quoted above that the February
26, 2024 memo was not any binding policy adopted by the City. The letter was just
prudent guidance devised by the City Attorney and adopted by the City Manager to
help Councilmembers avoid inadvertent violations of the City's ethics code. That is
why as noted in the Findings above, the memo just "asks" that councilmembers
follow its advice. The City Manager has no authority to adopt ethics policies that
bind the legislative actions of City Councilmembers3. That authority has to be
exercised by the City Council by adoption of resolution or ordinance, most
appropriately by amending the City's ethics code.
The February 26, 2024 memo is essentially just conservative and prudent legal advice
on how to avoid a special privileges violation. As emphasized throughout the ethics
proceedings of the last year, the special privileges clause is a broad, judicially
undefined and ambiguous ethics statute. Ms. Greenwood designed her guideline to be
at once simple and understandable while at the same time broad enough to cover all
contingencies. The advice protects Councilmembers from violating the ethics special
privileges clause in addition to the appearance of fairness doctrine as it applies to
quasi-judicial proceedings. To accomplish those objectives the guidelines necessarily
had to be extremely conservative.
The February 26, 2024 memo is the equivalent of telling someone unsure of the speed
limit to limit their speed to 25 mph to avoid a speeding ticket. Of course, someone
violating that advice by going a higher allowed speed limit is not guilty of speeding
solely for not following that advice. Similarly, Mayor Fabor is not guilty of an ethics
violation because he allegedly failed to follow the conservative advice of the
February 26 memo.
Reverand Cox's complaint against Mayor Faber is based upon the special privileges
ethics statute, RCW 42.23.070(l). That statute provides that ""[n]o municipal officer
may use his or her position to secure special privileges or exemptions for himself,
herself, or others." A recently issued Supreme Court decision summarized special
3 RCW 35A.13.080 defines the authority of city managers. Not surprisingly, it doesn't include the
authority to direct City Councils on how they can vote.
Ethics Complaint p. 4 Final Ruling
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privileges case law as circumstances where an official violates the law to confer a
benefit on another parry or uses her or his position to obtain a benefit that is harder
for others to obtain. Matter ofRecall ofRuelas, 565 P.3d 921, 926 (Wash. 2025).
Reverand Cox's prior complaint alleging a special privileges violation because of his
vote for the street improvements was dismissed as insufficient because the
improvements benefitted numerous persons other than Mayor Faber. See September
18, 2024 Faber Order Finding Partial Sufficiency; Hearing Officer October 7, 2024
email. Those reasons still apply and there is no basis to find an ethics code violation.
The advisory February 26, 2024 memo doesn't alter those conclusions. City officials
should of course not be penalized more because City staff advise that they act
conservatively to avoid potential ethics violations.
C. Mayor Faber Complied with February 26, 2024 Memo
Even if the February 26, 2024 memo were binding policy, Mayor Faber complied
with its terms. As previously quoted, the February 26, 2024 memo provided the
following advice for street projects:
... For example, if the issue were whether to pave streets and if so which
streets, you should not be involved in that decision process. Once the
decision was made for an action, you could be involved in the
implementation of the action.
The City Council approved a six -year street plan on January 9, 2023. That street plan
approved the Tyler Street Overlay project to the City's planned street improvements,
due to its state funding by the Transportation Improvement Board. See Ex. A and B
to Faber Motion for Summary Judgment. Mayor Faber's vote to approve part of the
funding for that street project was an implementation of the decision to do the
decision to do the improvement in the six -year street plan adopted in 2023. Mayor
Faber complied with the terms of the February 26, 2024 memo.
D. Appearance of Fairness Doesn't Apply to Legislative Actions
Reverand Cox continues to devote substantial portions of her motions to
characterizing actions subject to her complaint as legislative. Those efforts
undermine her case more than help it. Mayor Faber is completely correct that one of
the reasons his street funding approval was lawful was because it was a legislative
action and not a quasi-judicial permitting decision. Permitting decisions are held to a
much higher "ethical"' standard than legislative actions. Unlike legislative actions,
4 Violating the appearance of fairness standard doesn't by itself violate the ethics code. However, an
intentional violation would qualify as a special privileges violation if a council member used her position
to violate the appearance of fairness doctrine to confer special privileges to herself or others. As
previously noted, special privileges violations can occur where an official violates the law to confer a
Ethics Complaint p. 5 Final Ruling
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permitting decisions must appear to be free from self-interest in addition to actually
being free from such interest. Appearance of fairness doesn't apply to legislative
actions. That is why councilmembers cannot participate in permitting decisions for
projects located close to their homes but are allowed to vote on legislative decisions
to fund projects close to their homes.
Most City Council actions can be broadly classified as either legislative or quasi-
judicial (acting in a judicial -like capacity for actions such as permit review). Both
types of actions are subject to the City's ethics code. However, quasi-judicial actions
are also subject to the appearance of fairness doctrine, which is much stricter than the
ethics code. As noted in a Port Townsend court of appeals case in regards to a
permitting case: "The core of the doctrine [appearance of fairness] announced in
Smith and repeated often is that hearings to which the doctrine applies must not only
be fair in fact, but must appear to be fair and to be free of an aura of partiality,
impropriety, conflict of interest, or prejudgment. " Hayden v. City of Port Townsend,
28 Wash. App. 192, 196, 622 P.2d 1291, 1293 (1981).
The courts have expressly declined to apply the appearance of fairness doctrine to
decisions involving the approval of road projects, because those decisions are
legislative. In one pertinent case the WA Supreme Court held that a decision to
include a freeway interchange in a six -year transportation plan was not quasi-judicial
and thus not subject to the appearance of fairness doctrine. Harris v. Hornbaker, 98
Wash. 2d 650, 658 (1983). As noted by the court:
Unlike a judicial hearing where issues of fact should be resolved from
the evidence only without regard to the private views of the judges, a
legislative hearing may reach a decision in part from the legislator's
personal predilections or preconceptions. Indeed, the election of
legislators is often based on their announced views and attitudes on
public questions.
Id.
As noted in the quoted language above, decision makers can be biased in legislative
actions. In point of fact they may have even been elected for those viewpoints and
biases. That bias could well be partially attributable to self-interest. For example, a
city councilmember could be elected on the platform that City business taxes are too
high. The councilmember could feel that way both because of the impact the taxes
have on her personally as well as the damage those taxes do to the City's business
community. In that situation a court would be hard-pressed to find a special
benefit on another party. Matter ofRecall ofRuelas, 565 P.3d 921, 926 (Wash. 2025). Consequently, if
a court finds that a councilmember has violated the appearance of fairness doctrine in a permitting
decision, the violation can be used to allege a special privileges violation if the councilmember "used"
their position to violate that law to confer special privileges.
Ethics Complaint
Final Ruling
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privileges violation if the councilmember voted for an ordinance reducing business
taxes. The vote would clearly be based upon a measure of self-interest. However,
prohibiting the vote would disenfranchise the voters who put the councilmember into
office to protect their business interests.
The circumstances above are likely why the only court opinion finding a special
privileges -type violation for the exercise of legislative powers involved a street
vacation benefitting only a handful of properties. See Smith v. City of Centralia, 55
Wash. 573, 104 P. 797 (1909). The Smith case could be interpreted as finding that
when a legislative action only benefits a small number of people beyond the
councilmember, it is more difficult for the councilmember to claim that they are
acting out of the interests of the public at large as opposed to their own interests.
There is no question that Mayor Faber's street improvement vote was a legislative
action. As such it was not subject to the appearance of fairness doctrine. The
appearance of having his property located a half block from the street project is
irrelevant to the application of the City's ethics code. The fact that Mayor Faber's
law office was a half block from the improvements was not enough by itself to
establish an ethics violation if proven true. That is why the complaint was found
insufficient the first time and the February 26 memo makes no material difference
this time.
E. Cox Erroneously Applies Hearing Officer Ruling
Reverand Cox's repeated error in failing to distinguish legislative verses permitting
decisions includes comments made in her February 28, 2025 complaint against Mayor
Faber. Page 2 of that complaint states as follows:
In City Hearing Officer Phil Olbrechts sufficiency report in the Sept.
2024 Ethics Complaint against David Faber, On PI. 11-14 Olbrecht
stated "If Reverand Cox proves at hearing or summary judgment that
Mayor Faber knowingly illegally participated in the vote for the purpose
of benefiting his property, that would likely constitute the use of his
office to secure special privileges for himself in violation of the City's
ethics Code. " The Faber Memo attached, shows that Faber knew the
vote would be a conflict of interest and violation of RCW, yet
participated in the vote knowingly and willingly.
The quote above applied to a permitting decision taken by Mayor Faber that was
subject to the appearance of fairness doctrine. The quote does not apply to legislative
actions such as the street project near Mayor Faber's law office. The quote was taken
from the Hearing Officer's September 18, 2024 sufficiency ruling, addressing Mayor
Faber's alleged participation on a site specific rezone vote. Since site specific
rezones involve only a small number of property owners and are subject to approval
criteria, they are considered to be quasi-judicial (permitting) actions. See Snohomish
Cmy. Imp. All. v. Snohomish Cmy., 61 Wash. App. 64, 73, 808 P.2d 781, 786 (1991).
Ethics Complaint
p. 7
Final Ruling
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As such, if Mayor Faber had knowingly violated the appearance of fairness doctrine
by participating in a site specific rezone vote near property he owns to benefit his
property, he likely would have violated the City's ethics code. The quote cited by
Reverand Cox in her complaint is not applicable to this proceeding.
Reverand Cox applied the site specific rezone quote even though the same Hearing
Officer ruling from which she quoted expressly stated that the appearance of fairness
doctrine doesn't apply to Mayor Faber's street improvement vote. Quoting from page
2 of the same order from which she quoted:
Reverand Cox for some reason has emphasized in her current Faber
complaint that the funding vote [Tyler street improvements] at issue
was legislative. Such an argument is counter to her interests. The Buel
court decision that she references as requiring Council action to
"appear" fair only applies to quasi-judicial actions such as site
specific rezones, not legislative actions such a funding decisions.
Unlike quasi-judicial actions, legislative actions do no have to
"appear " to be fair.
Reverand Cox continues to repeatedly emphasize that the street improvement was
legislative. She is certainly correct and in so making that point establishes Mayor
Faber didn't violate the ethics code. The February 25, 2025 memo is right on target
as applied to quasi-judicial actions such as land use permitting decisions. It is a 25
mph advisory so far as legislative actions go and exceeds what is required for the
Tyler street overlay project.
F. Interrogatories
In her motion for summary judgment Reverand Cox has requested the right to require
Mayor Faber to answer interrogatories. That request is denied. Reverand Cox has
not identified any information she would gain from such discovery that would make
any material difference in the resolution of her current Faber complaint. It is
uncontested that the February 26, 2024 memo was solely prepared by City staff.
City staff have no authority to dictate the voting rights of councilmembers so Mayor
Faber was under no legal obligation to comply with the memo. Further, it is also
uncontested that the street project at issue had already been approved in the City's six
year street plan. Those facts are all that is necessary to establish no violation.
Reverand Cox has not identified any information she would gain from interrogatories
that would lead to different findings on those dispositive facts.
G. Altered Memo
Mayor Faber requested in his summary judgment motion that some form of Superior
Court Civil Rule 11 sanctions be imposed against Reverand Cox for deceiving this
tribunal as to the basis of the February 26, 2024 memo. Reverand Cox in her
response requests criminal prosecution against Mr. Faber for allegedly perjuring
Ethics Complaint P. 8 Final Ruling
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himself on the deception issue. Those requests are denied. The record does not
contain enough information to resolve the issue and the issue doesn't need to be
resolved to address the underlying ethics complaint.
In his summary judgment motion, Mayor Faber requested sanctions against Reverand
Cox for editing the February 26, 2024 memo and failing to identify that it was not
written for his law firm property. Mayor Faber asserts that instead the memo
addressed potential conflicts arising from another of his properties on 13'h street,
located more than a mile from the Tyler street project. The February 26, 2024 memo
produced by Mayor Faber clearly identified that it was written for the 13' street
property in its first paragraph. Mayor Faber alleged in his summary judgment motion
that the version of the memo included in Reverand Cox's complaint had been
"edited" to remove the first paragraph referencing the 13t' street property. Mayor
Faber stated in his motion that there was only one version of the memo, the one
produced by him for his motion.
The memo pasted in the next page below to the right is the memo produced by Mayor
Faber in his summary judgment motion and the memo pasted to the left is that
included in Reverand Cox's complaint against Mayor Faber. They clearly are not the
same memos. Curiously Reverand Cox does not expressly deny that she altered the
memo. This is likely just an oversite since she goes out of her way to assert that
Mayor Faber was lying when he accused Reverand Cox of altering the memo.
Mayor Faber's assertion that there's only one version of the February 26, 2025 memo
is inconsistent with the emails produced by Reverand Cox and summarized in the
Statement of Facts above. City Attorney Greenwood clearly stated that a version of
the memo had already been sent to Mayor Faber in a "prior" application. The emails
suggest that Mr. Mauro then altered the memo and sent an altered version to Mayor
Faber for another application. Whether or not the memos were the same isn't readily
verifiable in the record because Reverand Cox didn't include the memo attachments
in the materials she provided.
The issue of whether the memo was altered does not need to be addressed for the
resolution of the second Faber ethics complaint. The finding that Mayor Faber
complied with the memo and that the memo is not the product of City Council
adopted policies is not dependent upon the credibility of Mayor Faber, Reverand Cox
or either version of the memo. The only meaningful remedy for misrepresentation
available to the hearing officer would be dismissal of the complaint if Reverand Cox
were the disingenuous parry. Of course since the complaint is already dismissed such
an action would serve little purpose. If Mayor Faber were the disingenuous parry that
could not serve as the basis for finding an ethics violation for the legislative vote.
If the parties wish to further pursue the memo issue there are legal remedies outside
this ethics review available to them, with the extremes of perjury and defamation as
potential options. Copies of the memo apparently emailed to Mayor Faber on two
separate occasions should be readily available from a records request. As has usually
Ethics Complaint P. 9 Final Ruling
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been the case in these ethics cases, accusations of wrongful conduct usually turn out
to be misunderstandings or innocent mistakes. That's a likely outcome to this issue
as well.
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6spetisna•p dersurns are nat made h;i Ley stafff. A� a riarri nudmr, RCW 3SA d3,1120 wohdkrvCs.
Crnurndrnemrbers from directing staff actirrr.
G. Vexatious Litigation
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OWN a6er
FROM:
John Mauro, City Manager
CJC,
Steve King, Public Works direetor
Emma lediin, Planning and Community Uevslopment Director
Haiti Graenwcod, City Attorney
DATE:
FebruariH,2024
SUBJECT
Chapter 2.90PTMCIsc€osure
Property at IN' Street
Thou memo Is provided to conf rm and dueumant the following concerninE your propromd protect
on 1? Street and any passible permits assecrated with that proposal, including BIED 24.016,
61D24.017, SDP24 OGB,
1'o honor PTMC P.80 and cur aummltmentto conduct City business in afair, open, efficient and
aseountablemanneruvlthtnetcarilic?afRnterest,anddueioCheprohihrtinminRCW 42.23,l on
youn Ong yourpo0kdcn w8th the City to obtain any special pndrnlege, or favors and the prohibition
on City staff irarn giving you such spe,4 prRarleges or favors, we naed to ensure that
discrebonary decisions are W made by City staff, As a reminder, RCW 35A.13.120 prohibits
Caurr0roernitens from directing staff action.
Therefore, in any matter'inv6ing permits rented to fore shove proposal, we ask that you use
the following procedures:
First, have your agent or contractor make contact with the CPry whenever osvible.
Second, the City will generally process'routrne' decision tv "inquiries (thaws that requ'ure a
straight -forward application of law or design standards( In-house. For euample a requirement
the a'tructure have 8 5-foot setback iron a property line is a routine decision. On the Luther
hand, o request for a waiver of the S-faot setback sumld require staff to do an analysis of the
waiver criteria and exardes, ducrarion it appraming or denying the request. tt Is not a'routine"
decision.
Mayor Faber's summary judgment motion raises the difficult issue of vexatious
litigation. At this point all ethics complaints have been resolved and nothing
Reverand Cox has filed against any Port Townsend official has had any merit
whatsoever. As required by the PTMC the hearing officer will file a final report with
the City Council. As requested by Mayor Faber, that final report will include some
options that the Council could implement to curtail abuses of the review process.
Ethics Complaint
P. 10
Final Ruling
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Mayor Faber asserts in his summary judgment motion that "Cox is a vexation litigant
who has consistently and repeatedly filed frivolous complaints with the Hearings
Examiner that waste significant taxpayer resources and unreasonably undermining
public trust in the government of the City ofPort Townsend."
One portion of the comment above that is particularly troubling is Mayor Faber's
contention that the ethics complaints has undermined public trust in government. The
review process was of course designed to do the opposite. The Hearing Officer has
repeatedly emphasized in the sufficiency rulings that findings of sufficiency are based
upon a very low bar. A finding of sufficiency doesn't suggest any likelihood of
prevailing on the merits. Despite this, from the quoted comment above and others it
appears that the press might have taken the charges seriously anyway (the hearing
officer is not allowed to read about the case so doesn't know what's been written).
To prevent any confusion, it should be understood that nothing Reverand Cox has
filed established any reasonably debatable basis for an ethics violation once all the
pertinent facts were presented. In the few Cox claims that passed sufficiency, their
lack of merit became readily apparent once the defendants were given an opportunity
to be heard. Reverand Cox may well have raised legitimate political and/or moral
concerns about the YMCA transgender incident. That is not for the Hearing Officer
to judge. As to ethics violations, Reverand Cox ultimately identified none.
Mayor Faber seeks sanctions on the basis that Reverand Cox is a "vexation [sic]
litigant." Vexatious litigants can be barred access to legal forums. A vexatious
litigant has been described in a recent unpublished court case as follows:
In Washington, every court of justice has inherent power to control the
conduct of litigants who impede the orderly conduct of proceedings.
Trial courts have the authority to enjoin a party from engaging in
litigation upon a specific and detailed showing of a pattern of abusive
and frivolous litigation. We review a trial court's order limiting a
party's access to the court for an abuse of discretion.
(citations and internal quotations omitted). Maynard v. Est. of Maynard, 26 Wash.
App. 2d 1029, review denied, 2 Wash. 3d 1002, 537 P.3d 1027 (2023).
Quasi-judicial decision makers such as hearing officers have express and implied
authority, but not "inherent" authority as referenced above. Lejeune v. Clallam Cmy.,
64 Wash. App. 257, 270, 823 P.2d 1144, 1151 (1992). The Hearing Examiner Rules
of Procedure don't currently include any rules that authorize parties to be barred due
to vexatious litigation. Given the vulnerability of ethics review to abuse by persons
with political agendas, it may be worthwhile to amend the examiner rules to address
vexatious litigation.
Ethics Complaint
Final Ruling
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No final opinion is made yet as to whether Reverand Cox's plethora of meritless
claims qualify as frivolous or vexatious. The special privileges clause is broad and
vague. Reverand Cox clearly cares greatly about what happened at the YMCA. She
apparently believed she was doing the right thing to secure justice by using the
special privileges clause. That rational becomes less compelling considering the large
number of people that Reverand Cox has implicated as well as the fact that many of
her allegations had nothing to do with the YMCA. Reverand Cox has grasped at
every straw she can find to damage the people serving the Port Townsend
community. At some point the cumulative impact of such repeated attacks can no
longer be justified.
Order
The February 28, 2025 ethics complaint filed against Mayor Faber is dismissed with
prejudice.
Dated this 1st day of July, 2025.
Ethics Complaint
p. 12
PhW Dat4,-�
Phil Olbrechts
City of Port Townsend Ethics Hearing
Officer
Final Ruling