HomeMy WebLinkAboutEthics Complaint Order Granting Summary Judgement to Councilmember Nelson and Denying Summary Judgment to Reverand Cox; Report to Council RE: In re Councilmember Neil Nelson1
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BEFORE THE ETHICS HEARING OFFCER FOR THE CITY
OF PORT TOWNSEND
Phil Olbrechts, Hearing Officer
RE: In re Councilmember Neil Order Granting Summary Judgment to
Nelson Councilmember Nelson and Denying
Summary Judgment to Reverand Cox;
Ethics Complaint —Report to Council
SUMMARY
Summary Judgment is granted in favor of Councilmember Nelson and denied for
Reverand Cox. Mr. Nelson is not found to have violated the City's special privileges
clause or any other alleged ethics standard by volunteering the use of his business
premises to hold a constituency meeting. To violate the special privileges clause Mr.
Nelson likely would have had to intentionally use his council position to increase
revenue for his private business. Councilmember Nelson had no such intent. He just
wanted to make himself more accessible to his constituents.
This decision is a combined ruling of the Nelson summary judgment motions as well
as the report required by PTMC 2.80..050D to the City Council on those rulings.
The two -page Summary section of this decision should be considered the report to the
Council.
As everyone involved in the City's ethics review process knows by now, the City's
special privileges clause provides as follows:
(1) No municipal officer may use his or her position to secure special
privileges or exemptions for himself, herself, or others.
A critical issue to Councilmember Nelson's case is whether the term "use" bolded
above includes an element of intent. If no intent is required, Councilmember
Nelson's constituency meeting would be considered a violation if it generated
business for him even if that was the furthest thing from his mind. The issue hasn't
yet been directly addressed in Washington. The bulk of this decision explores cases
from other states having similar special privilege clauses. Those opinions make clear
that intent is required.
Ethics Complaint
P. 1 Order Granting Summary Judgment
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Councilmember Nelson's case is yet another example of the challenges in dealing
with the vagaries of the special privileges clause. Florida courts have invalidated an
almost identically worded special privileges clause on grounds it is unconstitutionally
vague. The Florida legislature subsequently amended its special privileges clause to
include an intent requirement and to reduce the violation penalty from criminal to
civil. The Florida Supreme Court found the amendment sufficient to remedy the
constitutional vagueness problem.
The complaint filed against Councilmember Nelson was based in part upon a decision
by the Tacoma Ethics Board finding that a real estate agent advertising himself as an
elected city councilmember violated the state's special privileges clause. As in this
case, intent was the central issue. The councilmember asserted it wasn't his intent to
suggest that he would use his position to help his clients. The Tacoma Ethics Board
found that intent wasn't required. However, that ruling was only made because the
Tacoma City Council amended its special privileges clause to only require "knowing"
violations as opposed to "intentional' violations.
If the Port Townsend City Council would like the same standards as Tacoma, it can of
course amend its code to impose a "knowing" mental state for the special privileges
clause. That would certainly create a commitment to a gold standard of ethical
behavior. However, the downside to such an approach is that it would make it very
difficult for Port Townsend public officials to know what conduct would be
considered unethical. In the alternative, the City Council could simply adopt
additional clear rules to its Rules of Procedure' or the like that set clear boundaries
for unacceptable conduct as the need for those standards becomes apparent from the
ethics review process. For example, as a result of this case the City Council could
adopt a rule that prohibits City Councilmembers from using their business premises
for constituency meetings.
Evidence Relied Upon
December 25, 2025 Nelson Ethics Complaint
December 6, 2018 Tacoma Board of Ethics Ibsen Recommendation, 2018-001; 2018-
002
February 8, 2026 Cox Summary Judgment Motion and Cox Declaration
February 18, 2026 Nelson Summary Judgment Motion and Nelson Declaration
February 18, 2026 Nelson Summary Judgment Response
' The Council could amend its ethics code to include rules of conduct adopted into its Rules of
Procedure. Rules of Procedure are usually adopted by resolution, which is a much less cumbersome
process for promulgating ethics rules.
Ethics Complaint p. 2 Order Granting Summary Judgment
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February 21, 2026 Cox Summary Judgment Response
February 21, 2026 Cox Summary Judgment Reply
February 23, 2026 Nelson Summary Judgment Reply
Findings of Fact
Procedural:
1. Complaint. By email dated December 25, 2025 Reverand Cox submitted an
ethics complaint against City of Port Townsend Councilmember Neil Nelson. The
complaint alleges violations of the Open Public Meetings Act and the special
privileges clause of the state ethics code, specifically RCW 42.23.070(1) as adopted
by PTMC 2.80.020. The complaint alleges violations of other sections of RCW
42.23.70, RCW 42.23.040 and RCW 42.52 as well. The basis of these violations is
that Reverand Cox asserts that Councilmember Neil used his City Council position to
generate business for himself by inviting persons to his place of business to discuss
constituency issues with him in his role as a City Councilmember.
2. Chronology. The OPMA violations were dismissed by Examiner email dated
January 7, 2026. The Examiner has no jurisdiction to address OPMA violations. In
any event the OPMA only applies to quorums of the City Council and in limited
circumstances committees acting on behalf of the City Council. Mr. Nelson's
meeting was just a meeting with his constituency. He was not acting on behalf of the
City Council as a whole. A finding of sufficiency on the special privileges allegation
was issued on January 27, 2026.
Substantive:
3. Public Official Status. Councilmember Neil Nelson is a City of Port Townsend
City Councilmember.
4. Constituency Meeting. While serving as a councilmember, Councilmember
Nelson advertised a December 13, 202 constituency meeting on a Facebook page. He
invited the public to attend the meeting at his business premises, Evergreen Fitness.
The invitation advised the public that the purpose of the meeting was to answer
questions about City government. The advertisement included the following
comment:
No you don't have to have a membership... it's only suggested... wink
wink (kidding... gees... lighten up).
5. Intent. Councilmember Nelson did not intend to use the constituency meeting to
generate revenue for Evergreen Fitness. There is no material question of fact as to
whether Councilmember Nelson intended to use the constituency meeting to generate
Ethics Complaint p. 3 Order Granting Summary Judgment
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business for Evergreen Fitness. Reverand Cox identified no facts other than the joke
quoted above that suggested that Councilmember Nelson intended to generate
revenue. In contrast, Councilmember Nelson submitted a signed declaration under
oath attesting that he had no intent to use the constituency meeting to generate
business. To further corroborate that position, Councilmember Nelson further
declared that at the constituency meeting he did not discuss membership pricing, offer
tours, distribute promotional materials or offer discounts, exemptions or preferential
business treatment. Councilmember Nelson also did not direct his staff to solicit
business. Given the absence of any evidence suggesting that Councilmember Nelson
did in fact intend to solicit business, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that an
outstanding factual issue exists on that issue.
Legal Analysis
There are two primary legal issues raised in this complaint. The first is whether intent
is required for a special privileges violation. The second is whether Mr. Nelson
intentionally violated the special privileges clause. It is found that intent is required
and Mr. Nelson didn't have that intent for the alleged special privileges violation at
issue. Reverand Cox also alleged violations of other portions of the City's ethics
code. Each of those other allegations is addressed below as well. The record is clear
that Councilmember Nelson committed none of the ethics violations alleged by
Reverand Cox.
Summary Judgment Review Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Civil Rule ("CR") 56(c).
Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party must present
evidence that demonstrates that material facts are in dispute; but "[i]f the nonmoving
party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to his case, then the trial court should grant the motion." Atherton Condo.
Apartment -Owners Assn Bd. of Dir. v. Blume Dev. Co., 115 Wn.2d 506, 516, 799
P.2d 250 (1990) (internal citation omitted). On cross motions for summary judgment,
the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
with respect to the particular claim. West v. Wash. Dep't of Fish and Wildlife, 21 Wn.
App.2d 435, 441, 506 P.3d 722 (2022)(internal citations omitted). Speculation and
argumentative assertions are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
Hungerford v. Dept. of Corr, 135 Wn. App. 240, 254 (2006).
Intent Required for Special Privileges Violation
The "special privileges clause" as referenced in this decision is RCW 42.23.070(1),
which provides as follows:
(1) No municipal officer may use his or her position to secure special
privileges or exemptions for himself, herself, or others.
Ethics Complaint p. 4 Order Granting Summary Judgment
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(emphasis added).
The plain meaning of the term "use" and court decisions from other states all lead to
the conclusion that the "use" term requires intent. This issue has been addressed
before under the City's code in the November 4, 2024 Order Granting Faber Motion
for Summary Judgment. That ruling determined that "[tJhe term 'use' in
RCW42.23.070(1) requires that a violator must intend to use his position to secure
special privileges for himselfand others."
The City's ethics code doesn't define "use." Finding an intent element in the "use"
term is consistent with the common meaning of the word. When a statute does not
provide a definition of the term, the courts look to dictionary definitions to determine
a word's plain and ordinary meaning. Branson v. Washington Fine Wine & Spirits,
LLC, 5 Wash. 3d 289, 296, 574 P.3d 1031, 1035 (2025). According to the Oxford
Languages' dictionary, "use" is defined as to "take, hold, or deploy, (something) as a
means of accomplishing a purpose or achieving a result, employ." One of the
Webster definitions of use is to "carry out a purpose or actions by means of." RCW
9A.08.010 defines intent in criminal statutes as "acting with the objective or purpose
to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime." As shown in the definitions, the
primary element of intent is to act with purpose, which is what one does when one
"uses" something, i.e. takes action to accomplish a purpose or achieve a result.
No Washington court or Attorney General opinion has addressed whether intent is
required for a special privileges violation. A Pennsylvania court expressly addressed
whether intent should be construed from the "use" term in Pennsylvania's special
privileges clause. See Kistler v. Com., State Ethics Comm'n, 610 Pa. 516, 523, 22
A.3d 223, 227 (2011). As quoted by the Pennsylvania court, the Pennsylvania special
privileges clause prohibits in relevant part the `[uJse by a public official ... of the
authority of his office ... for the private pecuniary benefit of himself... or a business
with which he ... is associated.' 65 Pa.C.S. § 1102." (emphasis added by
Pennsylvania court). The court fleshed out the meaning of "use" as follows:
The word "use " is not defined in the Ethics Act. The dictionary definition of
the noun "use" is "[t]he act of using or putting to a purpose[, e.g.,J the use of
a car; " analogously, the definition of the verb "use " is "L [t]o bring or put
into service or action: employ[, e.g.,J use a pen [or] use your imagination[ or]
2. to put to some purpose: avail oneself of[, e.g.,J use the bus to get to work. "
Thus, the common and approved usage of the word "use, " which must guide
our inquiry, indicates an action directed toward a purpose. Accordingly, to
violate subsection 1103(a), a public official must act in such a way as to put
his office to the purpose of obtaining for himself a private pecuniary benefit.
Such directed action implies awareness on the part of the public official of the
2 Oxford Languages is the dictionary used by Google for requests to define words.
Ethics Complaint p. 5 Order Granting Summary Judgment
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potential pecuniary benefit as well as the motivation to obtain that benefit for
himself.
22 A.3d at 227.
Oddly, the Pennsylvania court expressly posed the question of whether "use"
included intent but then provide a yes or no answer. However, requiring awareness of
a potential pecuniary benefit coupled with the "motivation" to get it doesn't seem to
be distinguishable from requiring intent. A concurring opinion of the case suggested
that the majority opinion did in fact require intent. 22 A.3d at 536 (Justice Saylor
concurring: "...For reasons that differ somewhat from the majority's rationale, I also
agree that evidence of intent is necessary to prove a Section 1103(a) violation... ).
Construing some level of intent is a fair and arguably necessary means of assuring
that public officials aren't broad sided by applications of the special privileges clause
that couldn't have been reasonably anticipated. A Florida case exemplifies the need
for intent of something like it to compensate for the vagueness of the provision.
Tenney v. State Comm'n on Ethics, 395 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). The
Tenney case involves a special privileges clause almost identical to that at issue in this
case. The Florida special privileges clause at the time the opinion was issued
provided as follows:
No public officer or employee of an agency shall corruptly use or attempt
to use his official position or any property or resource which may be
within his trust, or perform his official duties, to secure a special
privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself or others.
Section 112.313 Florida Statutes (1979).
Most pertinent to this case, the prior version of the Florida special privileges clause
had been ruled unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague. The prior version was
almost identical to the special privileges clause of this case, with the prior Florida
version providing as follows:
No officer or employee of a state agency, or of a county, city or other
political subdivision of the state, or any legislator or legislative employee
shall use, or attempt to use, his official position to secure special
privileges or exemptions for himself or others, except as may be
otherwise provided by law.
The Tenney court noted that the special privileges clause above, which is almost
identical to that in the State of Washington, was ruled in a prior Florida Supreme
Court opinion as unconstitutionally vague for the following reasons:
The statute is unconstitutionally vague and leaves its enforcement to the
whims of prosecutors. It does not "convey a sufficiently definite warning as
Ethics Complaint p. 6 Order Granting Summary Judgment
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to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practice. " State v. Lindsay, 284 So.2d 377, 379 (Fla.1973). The terms
"special privileges or exemptions" afford one no guidelines, no
"ascertainable standard of guilt, " Locklin v. Pridgeon, 158 Fla. 737, 30
So.2d 102 (1947), no barometer by which a public official may measure his
specific conduct.
395 So. 2d at 1245, quoting from Florida v. Roe, 366 So.2d 385 (1979)
The Florida standard for vagueness is essentially the same as that applied in the State
of Washington. As noted in one seminal Washington case on the vagueness doctrine,
"a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that
men [and women] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law."
Anderson v. Issaquah, 70 Wn. App. 64, 76 (1993).
The Tenney court found the new, current version of the ordinance to be sufficiently
specific because of the addition of the "corruptly" term and the change of the
ordinance from a criminal offense to a civil offense. The addition of "corruptly"
introduced an intent element to the offense which the court found sufficiently specific
for civil violations, reasoning as follows:
Corruptly is defined in section 112.312(7), Florida Statutes (1979), to
mean "done with a wrongful intent and for the purpose of obtaining, or
compensating or receiving compensation for, any benefit resulting from
some act or omission of a public servant which is inconsistent with the
proper performance of his public duties. " We believe that the word
"corruptly" as thus defined so limits the term "special privileges or
exemptions, " which the Rou court found overly vague, that the statute
now conveys the sufficiently definite warning of forbidden conduct to a
person of common understanding which our notions of due process
require. Similar reasoning was employed to reject the challenge to the
extortion statute in Carricarte v. State, 384 So.2d 1261 (Fla.), cent.
denied, - U.S. 101 S.0. 215, 66 L.Ed.2d 95 (1980). There the
supreme court stated that, "Just as the elements of malice and intent
prevent overbroad application of the statute, they lend sufficient clarity
to provide adequate notice of the proscribed activity to persons of
ordinary intelligence and understanding. "
It is interesting that rather than simply construe "use" as including an intent
requirement, the Florida court took the more extreme measure of invalidating the
ordinance. There appears to be ample room within the meaning of "use" to
incorporate an intent element. The Florida court's invalidation was likely primarily
motivated by the fact that the invalidated version involved criminal penalties.
Vagueness issues are held to a higher standard for criminal offenses.
Ethics Complaint
p. 7 Order Granting Summary Judgment
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It is also notable that the Florida court didn't default to an "as applied" application as
opposed to invalidation. In Washington State at least void for vagueness law is
assessed on an "as applied" basis. Matter of Troupe, 4 Wash. App. 2d 715, 423 P.3d
878 (2018). Applying constitutional principles "as applied" means that a statute
won't be entirely invalidated because of the language on its face. Instead of
invalidation, a vague statute is not applied if it's vague in its application to the facts
of a specific case. If "use" weren't construed as including intent, then the special
privileges clause would only be applied to find a violation in circumstances where the
special privileges clause could be reasonably interpreted as applying to the conduct in
question. "As applied" to this case, it's unlikely that a violation would be found since
persons of common intelligence could disagree as to the whether Councilmember
Nelson's conduct violated the special privileges clause.
The only other special privileges case the Examiner could find addressing the
meaning of "use" in a special privileges clause was Davidson v. Oregon Gov't Ethics
Comm'n, 74 Or. App. 160, 165, 702 P.2d 417, 420, affd, 300 Or. 415, 712 P.2d 87
(1985). The Davidson case involved a special privileges clause that similarly brought
into question the meaning of "use." The clause provided as follows:
No public official shall use his official position or office to obtain financial
gain for himself, other than official salary, honoraria or reimbursement of
expenses, or for any member of his household, or for any business with
which he or a member of his household is associate
The Davidson court used different Webster definitions of "use" to come to a different
conclusion as to what it meant. The court found that "the ordinary dictionary
definition of `use' is `to make use of,• to avail oneself of... "' The court then found that
the public official of that case had "availed" himself of his position for financial gain
by purchasing a vehicle for personal use under a government contract that provide a
high volume of vehicles to a government agency at a discounted price.
Davidson ultimately isn't of much use to this case because intent was not an issue in
Davidson. The Davidson public official was attempting to argue that based upon
prior case law the special privileges clause only applies to influence peddling. The
Court found otherwise. There was no question that the public official intended to
take advantage of his position to get a car discount. The Court's "avail" definition
could very well be construed as requiring intent. That appears to be an issue left for
another day in Oregon.
The need for an intent element in a special privileges clause appears to be further
confirmed by the Texas legislature, which amended its special privileges clause by
adding an intent requirement in 1984. The original 1970 adoption and its 1984
amendment are identified below:
1970 Adoption:
Ethics Complaint P. 8 Order Granting Summary Judgment
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No officer or employee of a state agency, legislator, or legislative employee
shall use his official position to secure special privileges or exemptions for
himself or others, except as may be otherwise provided by law. "
Tex.Stat.Ann. Article 62529 § 3(c) (Vernon 1970).
1984 Amendment:
No state officer or state employee should intentionally or knowingly solicit,
accept, or agree to accept any benefit for having exercised his official
powers or performed his official duties in favor of another." Tex. Stat.Ann.
Article 6252-9b § 8(e) (Vernon Supp 1984).
As noted in the Finding of Sufficiency of this case, Washington courts require intent
for violations of statutes such as the special privileges clause when serving as the
basis of recall petitions. See e.g. Matter of Recall of Inslee, 194 Wash. 2d 563, 451
P.3d 305, 308 (2019); In re Recall of Burnham, 194 Wash. 2d 68, 80, 448 P.3d 747,
753 (2019); Matter of Recall of Sawant, 197 Wash. 2d 420, 432, 483 P.3d 752, 760
(2021). Tracing back the long line of cases requiring intent, the first case to do so
based its holding upon the state constitutional requirement that recalls can only be
sustained for cause. See Matter of the Recall ofEstey, 104 Wash.2d 597 (1985). In
this regard there certainly is a greater basis for requiring intent for recall as opposed
to local ethics violations. The penalty for recall (removal) and the legal basis for it
(for cause) are more compelling than the factors necessitating intent for local ethics
violations. Nonetheless the reputational harm of alleged ethics violations is no small
matter. Further, the equities dictate that some semblance of "cause" must underly the
basis for ethics charges against persons who, excluding City employees, are
volunteering their time or getting nominally paid to improve their community.
Tacoma Board of Ethics Case of Nominal Relevance
The Nelson complaint focuses upon a recommendation of the Tacoma Ethics Board to
support its allegations. That recommendation is of nominal relevance because Tacoma
amended the state's special privileges clause to require "knowing" conduct as opposed
to "intentional" conduct. The analysis of the Tacoma recommendation was already
presented in the finding of sufficiency for this case. It is largely repeated here for ease
of reference.
Under Tacoma's code, intent is not required because Tacoma has modified the special
privileges clause to only require a "knowing" violation. The Tacoma special
privileges clause provides as follows, with modifications to the RCW 42.23.070(1)
standard highlighted in track change:
No Lit
y nmnieoa officer or employee shall knowinly use his or her o ice or
position to secure personal benefit, gain, or profit, or use his or her position
Ethics Complaint P. 9 Order Granting Summary Judgment
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to secure special privileges or exceptions for himself, herself, orb
the benefit, ,gain, or profits ofanv other persons otheps.
TMC 1.46.030H (emphasis added).
The modification of "use" to a "knowing use" is a major change in the mental state
(legally termed "mens rea") required for an ethics violation. The difference between a
"knowing" violation and an "intentional" violation is well defined by RCW 9A.8.010
in the state's penal code as follows:
(1) Kinds of Culpability Defined.
(a) INTENT. A person acts with intent or intentionally when he or she acts
with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a
crime.
(b) KNOWLEDGE. A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge
when:
(i) He or she is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described
by a statute defining an offense; or
(ii) He or she has information which would lead a reasonable person in
the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a
statute defining an offense...
Under the mens rea definitions above, under the "knowledge" standard
Councilmember Nelson would have committed a special privileges violation if he was
just aware or should have been aware that holding a constituency meeting at his
business premises would generate additional revenue for him. Under that standard he
wouldn't need to be aware that such conduct constituted an ethics violation. Under the
"intent" standard, Councilmember Nelson would only have committed a violation if he
held his constituency meeting at his fitness club with the purpose of generating
revenue for his business.
The Tacoma decision involved some marketing materials produced by Tacoma City
Councilmember Anders Ibsen. See Tacoma Ethics Board Decision No. 2018-001 and
2018-002. Councilmember Ibsen used the marketing materials to tout his experience
as a City Councilmember for his business as a real estate broker.
Councilmember Ibsen argued that the references to his council position were not a
special privileges violation because he did not intend to suggest that his role as a
councilmember would be used to attract new customers. The Ethics Board disagreed,
finding in Paragraph 3.14 that "the element of knowledge contained in TMC 1.46.030
H can be established without proof of a specific intent to secure a benefit or special
privilege in violation ofthe Code ofEthics."
Port Townsend hasn't modified the "used" term with Tacoma's "knowingly" term.
The issue of whether Reverand Cox must prove intent thus remains. It is also
pertinent that the Tacoma code is otherwise stricter than the Port Townsend code.
Ethics Complaint P. 10 Order Granting Summary Judgment
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TMC 1.46.010C requires that Tacoma's code of ethics must be "liberally construed
within the confines of Chapter 42.23 RCW..."' TMC 1.46.010A, also notes that the
ethics policy of the City of Tacoma includes avoiding the "appearance of
impropriety". The City's ethics code has no comparable requirements and is primarily
limited to adopting the state ethics code, Chapter 42.23 RCW.
Councilmember Nelson Didn't Violate Special Privileges Clause
As determined in Finding of Fact No. 5, Councilmember Nelson did not intend to use
his constituency meeting to generate business for his fitness club. As such, he did not
"use" his Council position for special privileges as prohibited by the special privileges
clause.
It should be recognized that even if intent were proven, it still wouldn't be entirely
clear if Councilmember Nelson had violated the special privileges clause. The
grounds recognized as special privileges violations are outlined in the September 18,
2024 Faber sufficiency ruling. The alleged Nelson violation doesn't fit squarely into
any of the categories of conduct recognized as special privileges violations. However,
if faced with an intentional use of a constituency meeting to generate business, there's
fairly good chance that the Attorney General's Office and/or the courts would find a
violation due to the direct and exclusive benefit to Councilmember Nelson.
Councilmember Nelson Didn't Violate Any Other Alleged Ethics Provisions
The Nelson complaint identified numerous other alleged violations that were clearly
not committed. As identified in Finding of Fact No. 2 above, an alleged Open Public
Meetings Act violation was dismissed by email on January 7, 2026. The remaining
allegations in the complaint were similarly meritless and should have been addressed
in the Finding of Sufficiency. To complete the record, the reasons why the remaining
allegations are not found sufficient for further review for the reasons identified below:
RCW 42.23.070(2): This statute prohibits a councilmember from receiving any
gift or compensation from anyone except the City for providing councilmember
services. As noted in Councilmember Nelson's summary judgment declaration,
Councilmember Nelson received no additional business revenue from his December
18, 2025 constituency meeting. There was no evidence alleged in the complaint to
suggest otherwise except for the general speculation that such a meeting could result in
additional business.
Since this issue wasn't assessed in the sufficiency stage of review Reverand Cox can
request reconsideration if she has any evidence not already presented that suggests that
Councilmember Nelson may have benefitted economically from his constituency
meeting. Reconsideration requests will be considered if filed within five calendar days
of the issuance of this ruling. If reconsideration is requested, the applicability and
interpretation of the statute is still an outstanding issue that will have to be resolved as
well if any additional business was in fact generated by the meeting.
Ethics Complaint P. 11 Order Granting Summary Judgment
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RCW 42.23.070(3): This statute prohibits a public official from accepting
benefits or engaging in business or professional activity that the officer might
reasonably expect would require or induce him or her by reason of his or her official
position to disclose confidential information acquired by reason of his or her official
position. There was clearly no violation of this statute. Elected officials should be
encouraged to meet with their constituencies and answer their questions. Engaging in
such activity does not require them or induce them to disclose confidential
information.
RCW 42.23.070(4): This statute prohibits the disclosure of confidential
information or the use of it for personal gain. There was clearly no violation of this
statute. The complaint alleges no specific disclosure of any confidential information
and identifies no use of it for personal gain.
RCW 42.52.160: This statute is not adopted into the City's ethics code. It is
inapplicable to Councilmember Nelson.
RCW 42.23.040: This statute is irrelevant to the actions alleged in the complaint.
RCW 42.23.040 addresses what types of interests a councilmember is allowed to have
in contracts with her or his city. There is no contractual interest with the City alleged
in the complaint.
Order
Summary judgment is granted to Councilmember Nelson. The December 25, 2025
complaint filed against him is dismissed as he requested. Summary judgment is
denied to Reverand Cox as she has not presented any material questions of fact that
could be resolved in favor of finding an ethics violation. As discussed in the analysis
of RCW 42.23.070(2) above, Reverand Cox may present new evidence in the form of
a reconsideration request if such new evidence presents a material question of fact as
to whether Councilmember Nelson accepted any compensation or gifts in return for
his holding a constituency meeting. Such a reconsideration request must be presented
by 5 pm, March 22, 2025.
Dated this 17'h day of March, 2026.
Phil Olbrechts
City of Port Townsend Hearing Officer
Ethics Complaint p. 12 Order Granting Summary Judgment